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HERDING CATS: WHAT TO Do WHEN STATES GET IN THE WAY
OF NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY
John Noor'
Shifting the United States' primary source of electricity from
non-renewable energy to renewable energy requires expanded
capacity to facilitate long-range transmission from regions where
it can be efficiently produced to large population centers where it
will be used In Piedmont Environmental Council v. FERC the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission could not site new interstate
transmission lines if a state had already denied approval. Denying
FERC's authority to site new transmission lines within National
Corridors will significantly influence the growth of renewable
energy. This Recent Development explores the impact of the
court's ruling on the spread of renewable energy and offers a
legislative solution to potential problems.
I. INTRODUCTION
World energy consumption is projected to increase by 26%
annually within the next twenty years.2 To put this number into
perspective, a 26% yearly increase is roughly equal to all of the
energy used by the United States, Canada, Mexico, Japan, South
Korea, and Australia in 2006.' This increase in demand for energy
' J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2011. I would
like to thank my mother and father for their support through my writing hurdles.
This would have never been possible without them. I would also like to thank
Professors Victor Flatt, Maria Savasta-Kennedy, and Norma Houston for their
invaluable feedback during this process.
2 Energy Information Administration, International Energy Outlook 2009, 121
(2009) (identifying the projected total world primary energy consumption from
2010 to 2030), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/pdf/0484(2009).pdf.
3 Id. (adding OECD North America with OECD Asia). OECD is the
designation given to members of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and
Development. Id. at ix.
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is expected to come primarily from Asia,4 and will result in
increased emissions of greenhouse gases.' In order to avoid
increased costs in energy like those experienced in mid-2000 and
reduce the emission of greenhouse gases, the United States has
identified increasing domestic renewable energy production as a
highly attractive opportunity. However, the United States' effort
to expand renewable energy has unearthed serious problems within
the country's electricity transmission system.' Currently, a
significant limitation on the spread of renewable energy is the lack
of capacity to link renewable energy producers with large
population centers in electrically congested areas around the
country.'
To address this problem, Congress included in the Energy
Policy Act of 2005' ("Act") a provision giving the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission ("FERC") the authority to site projectso
for the "construction or modification of electric transmission
facilities in a national interest electric transmission corridor"
("National Corridor")," when States had "withheld approval [to
site a facility] for more than 1 year." 2 One of the major concerns
4 Id. (looking at Non-OECD Asia Countries).
5 Id. at 111 (showing projected world carbon dioxide emissions).
6 "The rapid increase in world energy prices from 2003 to 2008, combined
with concerns about the environmental consequences of greenhouse gas
emissions, has led to renewed interest in the development of alternatives to
fossil fuels." Id. at 3.
7 Darrell Blakeway & Carol Brotman White, Tapping The Power of Wind:
FERC Initiatives to Facilitate Transmission of Wind Power, 26 ENERGY L.J.
393, 393 (2005) (suggesting that the most significant challenge to the expansion
of wind energy is "the lack of a robust transmission grid.").
8 id.
9 The Energy Policy Act of 2005, 16 U.S.C. § 824p(b) (2006).
'
0 See BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1513 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "site" as "a
piece of property set aside for a specific use.").
"16 U.S.C. § 824p(b).
12 Id. § 824p(b)(C)(i). There are a number of other circumstances that will
trigger FERC's authority to site interstate transmission lines. Those
circumstances are listed at 16 U.S.C. § 824p(b). National interest electricity
transmission corridors are "any geographic area experiencing electric energy
transmission capacity constraints or congestion that adversely affects
consumers." 16 U.S.C. § 824p(a)(2). Currently, national interest electricity
transmission corridors are comprised of parts of: Delaware, Ohio, Maryland,
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that states had with this legislation was how FERC would interpret
the word "withheld."" These concerns were intensified when
FERC finalized its rule making process and equated denying a
permit with withholding approval.14  States and citizen groups
challenged FERC's rule in Piedmont Environmental Council v.
FERC." The United States Fourth Circuit Court held that FERC
was incorrect in its interpretation that a State's denial of a siting
permit is within the meaning of "withheld."'" Critics claim that the
decision disregards Congress's intent and will slow the spread of
renewable energy." However, supporters claim that the court
New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia, California, and
Arizona are part of a national interest electricity transmission corridor. See
Pamela A. MacLean, Utilities Battle States Over Power Lines, NAT'L L. J., Apr.
14, 2008 at 1. Transmission facility is not defined in the statute or in the
subsequent regulations. The only guidance that was given by the Department of
Energy was in the final rule establishing the regulations for filing applications
for permits to site interstate electric transmission facilities "The only projects
that the commission will be issuing permits to are those that will fall under ...
[16 U.S.C. § 824p(b)]." Regulations for Filing Applications for Permits to Site
Interstate Electric Transmission Facilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 69,440, 69,463 (Dec. 1,
2006).
1 16 U.S.C. § 824p(b)(C)(i).
14 71 Fed. Reg. 69,440, 69,476 (Dec. 1, 2006) (The lone dissenter in the
hearing was Commissioner Suedeen Kelly who took the position that Congress
had not intended for FERC to have backstop siting authority when states denied
a siting permit. "There is no evidence to counter this presumption against pre-
emption. To the contrary, I find it inconceivable that Congress would have
specifically listed in section 216(b)(1) a number of circumstances that will
trigger Commission jurisdiction, yet fail to include on that list denial of a permit.
If Congress had intended to take away the States' authority to lawfully deny a
permit, surely it would have said so in unmistakable terms." (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
'5 Piedmont Envtl. Council v. FERC, 558 F.3d 304, 309 (4th Cir. 2009),
petition for cert. filed, (Sep. 17, 2009) (No. 09-343).
16 See id. at 313 ("We conclude that FERC's interpretation is contrary to the
plain meaning of the statute. Simply put, the statute does not give FERC
permitting authority when a state has affirmatively denied a permit application
within the one-year deadline.").
1 Steven Greenwald & Jeffrey Gray, Transmission Superhighway or
Interconnected Patchwork?, POWER, Apr. 1, 2009, http://www.powermag.com/
commentary/Transmission-Superhighway-or-Interconnected-Patchwork 1800
p2.html ("The lack of such a national interstate focus has produced a suboptimal
patchwork of transmission facilities; preservation of the traditional state-focused
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ruled correctly because, had FERC been allowed to maintain its
self-defined authority, utilities would have been able to sidestep
the state approval process, resulting in the expansion of coal based
energy."
This Recent Development argues that the court's holding will
slow the spread of renewable energy in National Corridors unless a
legislative solution is adopted. It also argues that had FERC been
allowed to site facilities after a state denied a permit it would have
led to the spread of non-renewable energy. Lastly, this Recent
Development offers a legislative solution that maintains the States'
role in siting transmission facilities, while promoting regional
interests to expand transmission capacity for renewable energy
producers. Part II discusses the United States' electricity
transmission system, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 that authorizes
FERC to site transmission lines, FERC's interpretation of that
authority, and the resulting challenge in Piedmont. Part III
identifies the two main viewpoints on how Piedmont will affect the
spread of renewable energy. Finally, Part IV offers an alternative
assessment of the case's impact, discusses the solutions proposed
by Congress, and offers an alternative proposal that will speed up
the siting of new interstate transmission facilities, while limiting
access by non-renewable energy producers and maintaining state
involvement in the decision making process.
paradigm will subject renewable resources available in the windy plains and
sunny desserts to electronic isolation.") (internal quotations omitted) (last visited
Sept. 18, 2009) (discussing the impacts of the Piedmont decision on the
interstate transmission of energy) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
Law & Technology).
18 See generally Mark Clayton, America's Future Wind Web?, Feb. 18, 2009,
http://features.csmonitor.com/innovation/2009/02/18/americas-future-wind-web/
(last visited Oct. 25, 2009) (discussing the potential for growth in wind energy
as well as the opposition to transmission lines by environmental groups who
think the lines will also carry coal based energy) (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology).
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II. THE ELECTRICITY TRANSMISSION SYSTEM: AMERICA'S
ELECTRON SUPERHIGHWAY
A. The Current Transmission System
The United States' electricity transmission system ("System")
is the super highway that moves electricity from producers into
communities." The System is composed of three separate
electricity transmission systems:20 the Eastern Interconnection,
Western Interconnection, and Texas Interconnection.2 1 These
systems contain over 150,000 miles of high voltage transmission
lines that transmit over $247 billion worth of energy annually.22
These transmission systems are valued at roughly $80 billion,23
making energy transmission "one of the largest and most capital-
intensive sectors of the economy. "24
The System, like a highway, is limited by its finite amount of
capacity at any given time. 25 Energy congestion takes place when
19 See generally Energy Information Administration, Electricity Transmission
Fact Sheet, http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/fact-sheets/
transmission.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2009) (explaining the basic
characteristics of the U.S. electricity transmission system) (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 U.S. Dep't of Energy, Office of Electricity Delivery & Energy Reliability,
National Electric Transmission Congestion Study 4 (2006) available at
http://nietc.anl.gov/documents/docs/Congestion _Study_2006-9MB.pdf.
23 See U.S. Dep't Of Energy, Office Of Electricity Delivery & Energy
Reliability, Overview Of The Electric Grid, http://www.energetics.com/
gridworks/grid.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2009) (providing a general overview
of the U.S. electric grid) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology).
24 Id. ("Total asset value is estimated at $800 billion with approximately 60%
invested in power plants, 30% in distribution facilities, and 10% in transmission
facilities.").
25 See generally Alberta Electric System Operator, AESO Long-term
Transmission System Plan Brochure: Energy to grow Alberta's Economy, 2
(2009) [hereinafter Brochure], available at http://www.aeso.ca/downloads/Long
TermBrochure_FINAL.pdf (An electricity transmission system "is like a
highway. It moves power from where it is produced to where it is used. . . just
like a highway moves traffic .... If the transmission highway is too small to
handle the needed flow of electricity, then it can become congested .... ).
FALL 2009] 149
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"flows of electricity on a transmission line ... are restricted below
the desired level . . . by the physical or electrical capacity of the
line."26 To use a familiar analogy, traffic congestion can occur
when lanes on a highway narrow, causing a bottleneck and
resulting in a reduced flow of traffic. Similarly, electricity
congestion occurs when there is a "transmission constraint"27 at a
certain point in a system that limits the amount of electricity
flowing to consumers. The problem for electricity, unlike annoyed
motorists, is that electricity cannot get off at the next exit and take
an alternative route.28 This limitation can result in increased costs
for consumers and blackouts.29
B. The Energy Policy Act of 2005
To alleviate electricity congestion, Congress gave FERC the
authority to site30 interstate transmission facility projects when
states failed to do so within a timely manner.' However, Congress
26 U.S. Dep't of Energy, supra note 22, at 6. (The Department of Energy
(DOE) was required by the Energy Policy Act of 2005 to do a national
congestion study that would identify areas where congestion was particularly
acute and designate them as National Electricity Transition Corridors (National
Corridors). These National Corridors would then serve as the areas where
FERC could exercise its back stop authority to site transmission lines if states
withheld approval for more than one year.).
27 Id. at vii ("The term transmission constraint may refer either to a piece of
equipment that limits electricity flows in physical terms or to an operational
limit imposed to protect reliability.").
28 See Erich W. Struble, Comment, National Electric Transmission Corridors:
Will State Regulators Remain Relevant?, 113 PENN ST. L. REv. 575, 585 (2008)
("When a [transmission] constraint prevents the delivery of electricity across a
line, several events often occur. First, electricity generation may be
redispatched, i.e., output from a generator on the consumer's side of the
constraint is increased while electricity generation on the other side of the
constraint is reduced. Second, previously planned wholesale purchases of
electricity, intended to meet demand at lower cost, may be cancelled. Third,
deliveries of electricity to consumers may have to be reduced.").
29 Id. ("[These] events increase consumers' electricity costs because the ad hoc
purchasing of demand-side generation is typically more expensive than
consumption of energy purchased wholesale in advance. Of course, [reducing
the electricity sent to consumers] . . . directly concerns energy reliability.").
30 See BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 3.
31 16 U.S.C. § 824p(b)(C)(i) (2006).
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did not give FERC unlimited authority to issue permits for new
line construction.3 2 FERC is only authorized to site facilities in
areas that the Department of Energy (DOE) has identified as
National Energy Interest Corridors." FERC's authority to act is
also limited within the National Corridors, and can only be used
when certain conditions are met.34 Specifically, FERC can issue
permits when:
[a] State commission or other entity that has authority to approve the
siting of the facilities has ... (i) withheld approval for more than I
year after the filing of an application seeking approval pursuant to
applicable law or 1 year after the designation of the relevant national
interest electric transmission corridor, whichever is later.3 5
32 See 16 U.S.C. § 824p(a)-(b) (laying out a number of conditions that must
be met in order for FERC to exercise its authority to site new transmission
lines).
3 Id. § 824p(b) (limiting the authority of FERC to only national energy
interest corridors). These corridors were identified in a study that was required
by the Act. See generally National Electric Transmission Congestion Report, 72
Fed. Reg. 56992 (Oct. 5, 2007) (identifying two national energy interest
corridors). The purpose for creating these corridors was to identify areas where
significant electrical congestion was affecting "economic vitality," and also to
determine whether the designation of "National Corridors ... would promote
energy independence, national energy policy, or national defense and homeland
security." Id. at 56994. Throughout the process the DOE was required to
consult with states that would be impacted by a corridor designation, as well as
any "appropriate Regional Entit[ies]." Id. at 56993.
34 See 16 U.S.C. § 824p(b) (identifying the conditions for FERC's authority to
be triggered).
" Id. § 824p(b)(C)(i)-(ii) (emphasis added); see 16 U.S.C. § 824p(b)(2)-(6)
(There are a number of other conditions that have to be met in order for FERC to
site new transmission lines. FERC's authority is triggered when "[flacilities ...
[would] be used ... in interstate commerce, . . . the ... proposed construction or
modification [would be] consistent with the public interest, . . . construction or
modification [would] significantly reduce transmission congestion ... and
protect[ ] or benefit[ ] consumers, . . . construction or modification [would be]
consistent with sound national energy policy and [would] enhance energy
independence, [and] ... the proposed modification [would] maximize, . . . the
transmission capabilities of existing towers or structure."); see 16 U.S.C.
§ 824p(b)(A-B) (listing conditions that must exist for FERC's siting authority to
be triggered).
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C. FERC's Interpretation of Their Authority
FERC gave notice of its proposed rulemaking process for the
applicable provisions of the Act in mid-2006.36 During that
process, FERC was asked to "clarify [whether] a State's timely and
lawful denial of a transmission project"" would be interpreted
within the meaning of "withheld approval," as used in 16 U.S.C.
824p(b)(C)(i)." Those who requested the clarification advocated
that including denial within the meaning would "allow an applicant
to sidestep an adverse State ruling by subsequently requesting
Federal jurisdiction."" Others suggested that a denial was not the
type of action Congress was trying to discourage when they gave
FERC limited authority. A state denying a project permit "would
36 See generally Regulations for Filing Applications for Permits To Site
Interstate Electric Transmission Corridors, 71 Fed. Reg. 36,258 (June 26, 2006)
(giving notice of proposed rulemaking); CRAIG N. JOHNSTON ET. AL., LEGAL
PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT 79-80 (2nd ed. 2007) (Rulemaking is the
process where executive branch agencies pass regulations that are used to
administer the laws passed by Congress. "[Tihe normal procedure required for
rulemaking is that: An agency must provide ... public notice in the Federal
Register of its intent to engage in rulemaking; the Federal Register is a daily
publication of the federal government, but today notice is additionally provided
through publication on the internet. The agency must [then] provide the public
an opportunity to comment on the agency's proposed rulemaking; the
opportunity to comment in writing is always provided; often the public is also
given the opportunity to comment orally at a hearing before agency officials.
The agency must [also] provide the public with adequate information about the
proposed rulemaking to allow for the public comment to be meaningful;
normally this means that the agency publishes an actual proposed rule as well as
information explaining what the rule does and why; in addition, factual
information that is the basis for the rule must be made available to the public.
The agency must consider the public comments, and when it issues its final rule,
it must respond to the significant comments made.").
37 See 71 Fed. Reg. 69,440, 69,444 (Dec. 1, 2006).
3 See id. at 69,442 n. 15 (discussing questions posed to FERC during their
rulemaking process); see also 71 Fed. Reg. 69,440, 69,444 n. 15 (listing the
"Department of Interior, Iowa Utility Board, Massachusetts Energy Board,
National Parks, National Regulatory Commissioners, Pennsylvania PUC, PJM,
Washington Council, Wisconsin PSC, [and] Western Energy Board" as having
requested the clarification on the part of FERC).
3 71 Fed. Reg. 69,440, 69,444 (asked by the Iowa Utility Board during the
rulemaking process).
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be a situation where a state agency acted properly and is not guilty
of regulatory failure."4 0
Despite strong opposition to the inclusion of "denial" within
the definition of "withheld," FERC, in the adoption of its final rule,
said, "a reasonable interpretation of the language in the context of
the legislation supports a finding that withholding approval
included denial of an application."4 1 In response, states and
concerned citizens groups requested that FERC reconsider its final
rule.42 FERC denied the motion for rehearing.4 3
D. Piedmont Envtl. Council v. FERC
Unsatisfied with the final rule adopted by FERC and their
refusal to reconsider their final rule, two states, New York and
Minnesota, and two citizens' groups, Piedmont Environmental
Council ("PEC") and Communities Against Regional Interconnect
("CARI"), filed actions claiming that FERC was incorrect in its
interpretation of 16 U.S.C. § 824p(b)(C)(i)." Petitioners argued
that "FERC ... had erred in holding that § 216(b)(1)(C)(i)'s phrase
'withheld approval' [of an application] for more than 1 year
includes a denial."45
40 Id. (asked by the Wisconsin PSC during the rulemaking process).
41 Id.
42 119 FERC 61,154, 61,978 n. 2 (2007). New York and Minnesota were
the only states to join the request for a new hearing based on a disagreement
over the definition of "withheld." See 119 FERC at 161,978 n. 5.
43 See generally 119 FERC 61,154, at 61,978 (order denying rehearing).
44 See Piedmont, 558 F.3d at 309. This suit was a consolidation of three
different suits, all of which were brought to challenge determinations made by
FERC during their rule making process. "[P]etitions for review of the final rule
and order were filed by the NYPSC in the Second Circuit, by the Minnesota
PUC in the D.C. Circuit, and by CARI in the D.C. Circuit. The petitions filed in
the Second and D.C. Circuits were transferred to the Fourth Circuit and
thereafter consolidated with the Piedmont petition." Id. at 312. Petitioner CARI
made other challenges to FERC's rulemaking that are also discussed in the case.
Id. at 315-20.
45 Piedmont Envtl. Council v. FERC, 558 F.3d 304, at 309 (4th Cir. 2009)
(internal quotations omitted).
FALL 2009] 153
N.C. J.L. & TECH.
In its review of FERC final rule, the court said it had to
determine whether Congress had been clear about its "intent." 46 If
Congress was clear, then "that is the end of the matter,"4 7 and
FERC's determination will be reversed. The court found that
Congress was clear and that FERC's decision to include deny
within the definition of withhold was "contrary to the plain
meaning of the statute." 48 The court rejected FERC's reliance on
"[a] thesaurus paragraph . . . list[ing] deny and withhold as
synonyms,"49 pointing out that this was a "backward approach to
its desired result."o The court added:
FERC['s] substitut[ion of] "denied" for "withheld," ignores the context
in which "withheld" is used .... The substitution renders the entire
phrase nonsensical because, in the context of dealing with a permit
application, the final nature of "denied" conflicts with the continuing
nature of "for more than 1 year."5'
The court also ruled that FERC's interpretation was incorrect when
looking at 16 U.S.C. § 824p(b) in its entirety.52 The court stated
that Congress "provides a carefully drawn list of . .. circumstances
when FERC may preempt a state . . . . These are limited grants of
46 Id. at 312. The court used a Chevron analysis to determine if the agency's
interpretation of the word "withhold" as used in 16 U.S.C. § 824p(b)(C)(i) was
reasonable. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (Under Chevron, "[w]hen a court reviews an
agency's construction of the statute which it administers, it is confronted with
two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is
the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines
Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does
not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in
the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is
whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute.").
47 Piedmont, 558 F.3d at 311.
48 Id. at 313.
49 Id. at 315. (internal quotation marks omitted).
50 Id. at 313.
5' Id.
52 See id. at 313-15 (discussing the significance of the rest of the section on
the interpretation of the word "withheld").
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jurisdiction to FERC, and they indicate that Congress meant for the
'withheld permit approval' circumstance to be limited as well.""
After making other brief points, the court reiterated that Congress
had been "clear" as to its intent on the issue and therefore the
court's "review ... proceeds no further. [W]e reverse FERC's
interpretation."5
III. THE IMPACT OF PIEDMONT ENVTL. COUNCIL V. FERC ON
THE SPREAD OF RENEWABLE ENERGY IN THE MID-ATLANTIC
NATIONAL CORRIDOR
Not surprisingly, after the court issued its opinion, groups
advocating for and against the decision began to make their voices
heard."5 While the court's ruling affects both of the country's
National Corridors," this Recent Development will focus on the
ruling's effects on the Mid-Atlantic National Corridor (Corridor)."
Critics claim the court's decision "should not be celebrated as a
victory for states' rights ... but as an impediment to ... the
development of renewable energy."" However, these claims
ignore the reality that the ruling was a tremendous win for states
and will only affect the spread of renewable energy in the short
term. Supporters counter, that had FERC's interpretation been
adopted it would have left "[state regulators] with little option, but
s3 Piedmont, 558 F.3d at 313-14.
54 Id. at 315.
ss See generally Pamela A. MacLean, Utilities Battle States over Power Lines,
NAT'L L. J., Apr. 14, 2008.
56 See 16 U.S.C. § 824p(b)(C)(i) (2006).
5 The Mid-Atlantic Corridor is a group of states in the Northeast part of the
country that were identified by the DOE as a National Interest Energy Corridor
in their 2006 study that was required by Congress in the Act. The states within
the Corridor include parts of Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, New York,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia and West Virginia. The District of Columbia is
also within the Corridor. The other corridor is the Southwest Area National
Corridor and includes parts of California and Arizona. See generally National
Electric Transmission Congestion Report, 72 Fed. Reg. 56992 (Oct. 5, 2007)
(describing the process for establishing the corridors).
58 William A. Mogel, William Mogel of Piedmont Envtl. Council v. FERC,
2009 EMERGING ISSUEs 3473 (2009).
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to say yes or have FERC do it for them."" They contend it would
also have allowed "dirty coal power from West Virginia and Ohio
to [move] east, severely threatening the viability of . .. wind power
"160
Electricity producers of both renewable energy and non-
renewable energy claim that a centralized siting authority in the
Federal government is vitally important,6 1 while state regulators
and small environmental groups oppose FERC's broad authority. 62
The interesting part about how the battle lines were drawn over the
Piedmont decision is that on both sides, one finds, supporters of
renewable energy.63 Instead of being divided into different camps
based on support for renewable energy, the key characteristic
determining whether a group supported FERC in the litigation was
whether they were part of the energy industry.'
s9 MacLean, supra note 55, at 1.
60 Id. The argument that coal energy from the western portion of the Corridor
would make it harder for more expensive renewable energy to compete in
markets like New York is discussed infra in Part III.B.
61 See id. at 1 ("[I]nvestor-owned utilities think the role is critical."); see also
AMERICAN WIND ENERGY ASSOCIATION & AMERICAN SOLAR INDUSTRIES
ASSOCIATION, GREEN POWER SUPERHIGHWAYS: BUILDING A PATH TO
AMERICA'S CLEAN ENERGY FUTURE 2 (2009), [hereinafter Green Superhighway
Study] http://www.awea.org/GreenPowerSuperhighways.pdf (last visited Oct.
29, 2009) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &Technology).
62 See generally Steve Gelsi, National Grid Plan Presents Super-Sized
Headache, MARKET WATCH, July 9, 2009, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/
power-showdown-looms-over-new-utility-lines (last visited Oct. 29, 2009)
(detailing opinions given at hearing held by the House Committee on Energy
and Commerce) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
63 See generally Green Superhighway Study, supra note 61; see also The
Future of the Grid: Proposals For Reforming National Transmission Policy
Before the H. Subcomm. on Energy and the Environment, 111th Cong. 142-46
(2009) (statement of Christopher Miller, President, Piedmont Environmental
Council).
6 See Piedmont, 558 F.3d at 304. All of the intervenors in support of the
respondent, FERC, were part of the energy industry. "Southern California
Edison Company; Allegheny Power; Trans-Allegheny Interstate Line Company;
Edison Electric Institute; American Public Power Association; National Rural
Electric Cooperative Association; American Wind Energy Association; San
Diego Gas & Electric Company; PPL Electric Utilities Corporation." In contrast,
the intervenors in support of Piedmont included the states of California, New
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A. Critics: The Courts Decision Will Slow the Spread of
Renewable Energy
Critics of the Piedmont ruling base their objections on the
theory that the spread of renewable energy will be severely limited
if there is not a strong centralized authority to take a national
perspective when considering proposals of new interstate
transmission facility construction projects.65 The basis for this
theory appears to come from years of waiting for approval of new
transmission line projects when control has been vested in the
states."
Utility companies also want FERC approval of lines because
they have encountered problems with state approval after
proposing plans that needed regional coordination to link energy
producers in one state with customers in another." State
opposition has been particularly acute when the project would
cross through states that would not be serviced by the new lines."
States that will not be serviced by proposed transmission line
projects are hesitant to approve proposals that would require the
use of eminent domain powers to acquire land from residents while
"heap[ing] environmental and aesthetic insult upon .. . localities
... [that will not receive] any benefit."69 Because of each state's
permitting power in the siting process, failure by any one state to
York, Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, New
Hampshire, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
Id.
65 See Green Superhighway Study, supra note 61.
66 Gelsi, supra note 62 ("One 90-mile line took 16 years to get all the
necessary sign-offs.").
67 See generally Denise L. Desautels, Who Should Regulate the Siting of
Electric Transmission Lines Anyway? A Jurisdictional Study, THE ELECTRICITY
J., May 2005 (discussing the challenges to siting interstate transmission lines).
68 Id.
69 Id. at 13; see also Green Superhighway Study, supra note 61, at 2 ("State
regulators, who in many areas have primary jurisdiction over what transmission
gets built and who pays for it, are often required to weigh only the benefits that
will accrue to residents of that state. . . . Under this regulatory structure, it is
almost impossible to build an interstate transmission network. Most state
regulators have little authority or incentive to require ratepayers in their state to
help pay for an interstate network.").
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approve of the interstate transmission line proposal results in a veto
of the entire multi-state transmission project."
Lastly, critics argue, federal siting may be preferable because
of changes in the energy market itself. Historically, states have
held the authority to site new transmission lines.' This authority
was appropriate through most of the twentieth century because
markets for electricity were "highly balkanized, and locally
based."72 Accordingly, states used an analysis to determine whether
there was a need by state residents for new infrastructure before
issuing permits for new transmission lines." The reality is that
energy markets have changed from "local command-and-control
electric production and distribution to regional market-controlled
production and distribution."74 The increased national demand for
renewable energy has also added new pressures on states with
limited interstate connectivity to build new interstate transmission
lines." The support for FERC to be given siting authority
vocalizes a fear that plans for new transmission lines will continue
70 See Desautels, supra note 67, at 13.
n See Jim Rossi, Transmission Siting In Deregulated Wholesale Power
Markets: Re-Imagining The Role Of Courts In Resolving Federal-State Siting
Impasses, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y. F. 315, 315 (2005) ("During most of the
twentieth century, state and local regulatory bodies coordinated the siting of
power plants and transmission lines.").
72 See generally Desautels, supra note 67, at 11-12 (In this context the term
"highly balkanized" refers to the small units that the markets had been broken
into).
7 Id. at 13 ("For the most part, state siting proceedings involve a
determination of need." (citing A. Brown and D. Danials, Vision Without Site:
Site Without Vision, Harvard Electricity Policy Group)).
74 Steven J. Eagle, Securing A Reliable Electricity Grid: A New Era In
Transmission Siting Regulation?, 73 TENN. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (2005) (discussing
the Energy Policy Act of 2005 and its potential impacts on interstate energy
transmission).
7 See EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE, TRANSMISSION PROJECTS: SUPPORTING
RENEWABLE RESOURCES REPORT 6 (2006) [hereinafter Transmission Projects
Report] ("Wisconsin has only limited transmission line connections to other
states compared to its neighboring states which limit[s] the ability of electric
utilities to access wind energy."), available at http://www.eei.org/ourissues/
ElectricityTransmission/Documents/TransprojRenew web.pdf.
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to face difficult and prolonged battles if authority remains with the
States.76
B. Supporters: The Courts Decision Limits the Spread ofNon-
Renewable Energy
Supporters of the court's decision claim that if FERC's
interpretation of "withheld" had been approved, it would have
resulted in an explosion of new transmission line approvals that
would transmit coal-powered energy from Ohio and West Virginia
into the Northeast portion of the Mid-Atlantic National Corridor:
Expanded capacity to transmit electricity would likely mean an even
greater near-term flow of coal-fired electricity . . .. Lower congestion
costs would make coal-fueled power plants in the west even more
competitive, while power producers in eastern ... states [would]
continue to face higher fuel costs because of their greater dependence
on natural gas. This trend could spur even more proposals for new coal
plants and new transmission capacity, as electricity production moved
away from higher-priced states.78
The average price of electricity for residential consumers in June
of 2009 was 19.54 cents per kilowatt-hour in New York, while the
average cost of residential electricity during the same time in West
Virginia and Ohio was 7.95 cents and 11.38 cents, respectively. 79
If energy producers in West Virginia were connected with
customers in New York, the difference in electricity costs would
create an economic incentive to sell as much energy in New York
as possible. If West Virginia producers sell more electricity to
New York then the price of electricity in New York would fall due
to the increased supply of electricity and the lower cost of
production in West Virginia. The transmission of cheaper coal-
76 See generally Gelsi, supra note 62, at 2.
n UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, IMPORTING POLLUTION: COALS
THREAT TO CLIMATE POLICY IN THE U.S NORTHEAST REPORT 17-18 (2008)
available at http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/clean energy/importing-
pollution report.pdf [hereinafter Importing Pollution Study].
78 Id. at 18; see also Clayton, supra note 18.
79 Energy Information Administration, Average Retail Price of Electricity to
Ultimate Customers: Total by End-Use Sector, 1995 Through June 2009,
ELECTRIC POWER MONTHLY, Sept. 2009, at 102, available at http://www.
eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epm/table5_3.html (showing the average retail
price of electricity by end user).
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based electricity in eastern States in the Corridor would result in
lower priced electricity from non-renewable sources and thus make
renewable energy less competitive.so
Supporters also have doubts about the ability to limit the spread
of non-renewable energy once it is linked into new transmission
lines."' The reality of electricity transmission is that transmission
lines cannot be structured so that only renewable energy will be
sent to customers.82 Supporters believe that an expansion of new
transmission lines without adequate controls to restrict access by
non-renewable energy producers will incentivize investment in
existing coal power plants thereby further delaying their eventual
shutdown." For support of their position, supporters point to
statements made by non-renewable energy interest groups like the
West Virginia Coal Association:
Enhanced transmission capacity helps increase the amount of low-cost,
coal fired generation dispatched into the regional grid. This helps
preserve the future of existing power plants already on line, justifies
additional investment in these plants and increases the likelihood that
new, clean-coal electric fired generation will be constructed .... 84
Supporters of the court's decision have an earnest desire to
encourage the spread of renewable energy; however, their
80 Matthew L. Wald, Cost Works Against Alternative Energy and Renewable
Energy Sources in Time of Recession, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2009, at A18,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/29/business/energy-environment
/29renew.html ("A modem coal plant of conventional design, without
technology to capture carbon dioxide before it reaches the air, produces at about
7.8 cents a kilowatt-hour; a high-efficiency natural gas plant, 10.6 cents; and a
new nuclear reactor, 10.8 cents. A wind plant in a favorable location would cost
9.9 cents per kilowatt hour. But if a utility relied on a great many wind
machines, it would need to back them up with conventional generators in places
where demand tends to peak on hot summer days with no breeze. That pushes
the price up to just over 12 cents, making it more than 50 percent more
expensive than a kilowatt-hour for coal.").
8' See generally H. Subcomm. on Energy and the Environment, supra note 63.
82 Id.
83 See generally Letter from Bill Raney, President of the W. Va. Coal
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apprehension towards Federal control stems from a fear that
current regulation would not limit access by non-renewable
electricity producers to new transmission lines."
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW ON THE EFFECTS OF PIEDMONT ON
RENEWABLE ENERGY IN THE MID-ATLANTIC CORRIDOR,
PROPOSED CONGRESSIONAL SOLUTIONS, AND AN ALTERNATIVE
COURSE OF ACTION
A. An Alternative View
The positions taken by both supporters and critics of the
Piedmont case articulate a consistent reality. The Mid-Atlantic
Corridor's transmission capacity limitations are legitimate
obstacles to expanding renewable energy, and liberal access to new
capacity poses the threat of perpetuating the use of inexpensive
coal as a competitor to more expensive renewable options."
The divide separating critics and supporters however, is not
about who is right or wrong about the impact that Piedmont will
have on renewable energy. Both camps are correct in their
assessment of what would likely have resulted had FERC been
granted broad siting authority and what will result without a
federally coordinated transmisson siting authority." The truly
divisive issue splitting renewable energy supporters is over who
85 See H. Subcomm. on Energy and the Environment, supra note 63, at 143
("[The proposed interstate transmission line] was originally overlaid over wind
resources, but in fact, the correspondence with coal resources is actually higher
when you actually go see where those lines are laid out. That is one of the
causes of concern that in fact what you would be doing by doing ... is in fact
encouraging greater transmission of coal-fired generation than ...
renewables.").
86 See Letter from Bill Raney, supra note 83.
87 As explained supra in Part III, experience has shown critics of the Piedmont
holding that lack of centralized authority to site new interstate transmission lines
can lead to long approval processes and uncertainty in the final result because of
the veto power that a state has on a project that would travel through its borders.
Supporters of the ruling are also correct that the lack of restrictions preventing
renewable energy producers from accessing the new interstate lines would
prolong the life of coal plants and spread cheap non-renewable energy to new
markets where it would make renewable energy less competitive.
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should control the siting of new interstate transmission lines and
how access to those lines should be managed. Critics felt that the
need to expand interstate transmission capacity to accommodate
renewable energy was more important than worrying about who
would have access to new transmission lines. Supporters believed
that limiting the access of non-renewable energy producers was
imperative in order to promote more efficient conservation efforts
occurring locally and avoid the Pandora's box of problems that
would have resulted from unfettered access to the grid."
B. Proposed Congressional Solutions
After the court handed down its decision in Piedmont,
Congress conducted a series of congressional hearings in order to
determine if new legislation is needed in light of the limit placed
on FERC's siting authority." These hearings led to three bills
submitted by members of both the House and Senate that propose
to expand FERC's siting authority in varying degrees. Each plan is
briefly discussed below and is identified by its respective
legislative sponsor.
1. The Waxman Plan
The Waxman Plan was included in the American Clean Energy
and Security Act of 2009, sponsored by Representative Henry
Waxman, and passed by the House in June 2009." The Waxman
Plan gives FERC the authority to issue a "certificate of public
convenience and necessity for the construction or modification of a
transmission facility"" when a State entity that has authority to
88 See H. Subcomm. on Energy and the Environment, supra note 63, at 51
(statement of Paul Hibbard, Chairman of the Massachusetts Department of
Public Utilities, "Under these proposals, FERC's traditional authority is
expanded to where it becomes a de facto central planning authority ...
potentially diminishing the development of the abundant level of demand
reduction and renewable resources that are available at the local level . . ).
89 See generally Transmission Infrastructure Before the S. Comm. on Energy
and Natural Resources, I 11th Cong. (2009); H. Subcomm. on Energy and the
Environment, supra note 63.
90 See H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 151 (2009) (As of October 14, 2009 the bill
was placed on the Senate legislative calendar under general orders calendar No.
97).
' Id. § 216B(b). A certificate of public convenience and necessity is given by
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grant approval for the siting fails to issue a decision within one
year or denies approval for a new transmission facility.9 2 This
legislation would maintain State authority for siting new
transmission facilities in the eastern part of the country but allows
FERC to site new transmission facilities under certain conditions
in the Western Interconnection.9 3 Representative Waxman
represents California which is within the Western Interconnection
and appears to be more comfortable with FERC siting authority.9 4
While the Waxman Plan offers a solution for western States, it fails
to deal with the challenges of expanding transmission capacity in
the Mid-Atlantic Corridor. The absence of planning and siting
solutions for the eastern portion of the country makes the Waxman
Plan an incomplete attempt at fixing a problem that is present in
multiple areas across the country.
2. The Reid Plan
The Reid Plan, submitted by Senator Harry Reid of Nevada,
uses language that focuses on promoting the spread of renewable
energy across the entire country." In the Reid Plan, "national
renewable energy zones"9 would be identified in both the Eastern
and Western Interconnections." These designations would be
a state regulatory body to public utilities so that they can build transmission and
other electricity infrastructure. Id.92 Id. § 216B(b)(7)(A)-(B).
9 The Western Interconnection is the part of the national electricity grid
system that is located within the states of New Mexico, Arizona, California,
Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Nevada, Colorado, Utah, Wyoming, Alaska, and
Montana.
94 Id. § 216B(a); see also H. Subcomm. on Energy and the Environment, supra
note 63, at 58 (statement of Richard Halvey, Representative of the Western
Governors, referring to assistance with transmission planning. "[T]he Western
State Governors recognize that we need help from the Congress.").
9 See generally S. 539, 111th Cong. § 402(a)(1) (2009).
96 Id.
97 Id.; see also Energy Information Administration, Electric Power Industry
Overview 2007 (2007) [hereinafter Power Industry Overview], http://www.
eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/prim2/toc2.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2009)
("The U.S. bulk power system has evolved into three major interconnected
systems ... [interconnections], within which regional transmission
organizations . . . exist to operate transmission systems in a non-discriminatory
manner.... The major ... [interconnections] consist of extra-high-voltage
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similar to the Mid-Atlantic and Southwest Area Corridors in that
they identify areas that are currently lacking adequate transmission
capacity." FERC would also select a "regional planning entity"99
for each interconnection that would be responsible for developing
an "Interconnection-Wide Green Transmission Grid Project
Plan""o ("Grid Project Plan"). These plans are intended to
"enhance transmission access for electricity from renewable
energy in renewable energy zones."'
The Reid Plan would also change FERC's current siting
authority by allowing FERC to site new transmission projects that
are designated as part of a Grid Project Plan, or would connect
"renewable energy resources from renewable energy zones or . . .
integrate renewable resources from other geographic areas.""0
When exercising its siting authority, FERC is required to consult
with States by allowing them to "identify siting constraints and
mitigation measures, based on habitat protection, environmental
considerations, or cultural site protection."' FERC must then
incorporate those suggestions unless the State suggestion would be
"inconsistent ... infeasible, or not cost effective" with the plan."
connections between individual utilities designed to permit the transfer of
electrical energy from one part of the . . . [interconnection] to another. These
transfers are restricted, on occasion, because of a lack of contractual
arrangements or because of limited transmission capability.") (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
98 S. 539 § 402(a)(1)(B).
99 Id. § 401(13) (Regional planning entity "means an entity certified by the
Commission to coordinate regional planning for an Interconnection.").
00 Id. § 403(a) (The plans would be designed to "achieve Interconnection-
wide coordination of planning to integrate renewable energy resources from
renewable energy zones into the interstate electric transmission grid and make
the renewable energy resources fully deliverable to electricity consuming
areas."); see id. § 403(e)(l)-(8) (listing the requirements of a green transmission
grid project plan).
1o1 Id. § 403(e)(1).
102 Id. § 404(a)(1)(B) (The resource referenced in this quote could, for
example, be an area on which the developer would put a wind farm, solar farm
or other renewable energy facility. The zone is the area that would be
designated as a national renewable energy zone under § 402(a)(1).).
'03 Id. § 404(g)(1)(A).
'04S. 539 § 404(g)(1)(B)(ii)(II).
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The Reid Plan is more complete compared to the Waxman Plan
because it changes the siting process for the Eastern and Western
Interconnection.'0 5  It also prevents non-renewable energy
producers from benefiting from FERC's siting authority unless
their project is included in a grid project plan.' 06 However, the
Reid Plan still strips States of their ability to plan independently
from the federal government, which is why states opposed FERC
in Piedmont. The plan also fails to prevent States from approving
intrastate transmission lines that would connect non-renewable
energy producers in their state with new interstate transmission
lines.o' Lastly, the regional planning entities may not accurately
design appropriate grid plans for all of the regions within a
particular interconnection.
3. The Bingaman Plan
The plan proposed by Senator Jeff Bingaman is similar to the
Reid Plan."' It would allow FERC to have siting authority if
States had not acted within one year or had denied a plan within
that time.' 9 The Bingaman Plan would also require the
development of an "[i]nterconnection-wide transmission plan""0 to
be used to coordinate the planning for "high-priority national
'os Id. § 402(a)(1).
106 Id. § 404(a)(1)(A).
107 There is a requirement that the "transmission provider" for a transmission
project approved under this process certify on an annual basis that "75 percent
of the transmission capacity of the project is available to renewable resources."
Id. § 404(k)(1). However, the legislation allows the Commission to override
this requirement in order to meet its reliability requirements, "the Commission
may reduce the minimum percentage specified in paragraph (1) in any case in
which the Commission determines that it is necessary . . . to maintain
compliance with Commission approved reliability standards." Id.
§ 404(k)(3)(A).
los See S. 1462, 11Ith Cong. (2009) (Bingaman Plan); see S. 539, 111th Cong.
(2009) (Reid Plan).
109 S. 1462 § 216(d)(3)(B) (2009).
"o Id. § 216(c)(1); see id. § 216(c)(2)(B)(i)-(iv) (addressing a number of
issues including how utilities, States, Indian tribes and others "incorporate
consideration of the need for high-priority national transmission projects[,] ...
identify needed additions ... to high-priority national transmission projects[,]
. . . [and] address alternatives to ... national transmission projects.").
FALL 2009] 165
N.C. J.L. & TECH.
transmission projects.""' One of the positive things the Bingaman
Plan incorporates into the planning process is an evaluation of how
"existing and potential demand side management"" 2 could mitigate
the need for new transmission lines."' The Bingaman Plan does
not, however, limit FERC's authority to permit new transmission
lines that would link non-renewable energy producers into the grid.
Under the Bingaman Plan if a "regional plan,"" 4 submitted during
the planning phase, included a transmission project to link in a
non-renewable energy facility, it will have satisfied all of the Bill's
requirements to trigger FERC's siting authority if a State fails to
subsequently approve the project." The effect of this Plan is
similar to what would have occurred if FERC's interpretation of
"withheld" had been approved in Piedmont.
C. An Alternative Course ofAction
The structure that was put in place under the Energy Policy Act
of 2005 is not an irreparably flawed way of centralizing the
planning and siting process for new transmission facilities. It
provides for periodic studies to identify congested electrical areas
.. S. 1462 § 216(c)(2)(B)(i); see also id. § 216(b)(1) ("[H]igh-priority
national transmission project means an overhead or underground transmission
facility, consisting of conductors or cables, towers, manhole duct systems, phase
shifting transformers, reactors, capacitors, and any ancillary facilities and
equipment necessary for the proper operation of a facility.") (internal quotes
omitted).
112 Id. § 216(c)(2)(C)(iii).
113 Demand side management is also referred to as energy conservation and
efficiency measures. If the amount of electricity needed can be reduced through
conservation, then the saved electricity can be used to meet new electricity
demand instead of constructing costly new transmission lines.
114 S. 1462 § 216(c)(3)(A)(ii) (stating that these regional plans could be
created by "[a]ny public utility" and would allow them to develop a regional
plan "relating to any high priority national transmission project[ ] planned for
the system." These regional plans could include a transmission project that
would link in a non-renewable electricity facility).
"' Id. § 216(d)(3)(B)(i)-(iii) (authorizing FERC to site when a state fails to
approve a "high-priority national transmission project."). If a utility includes a
transmission line project that would operate at above 345 kilovolts AC power in
the regional plan it submits to FERC pursuant to § 216(c)(3)(A)(ii), it will have
met the requirements to be considered a Project. See id. § 216(b)(1)(A)(i)(I).
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in the country,"'6 empowers a federal agency with limited authority
to step in when impasses among the States prevent the expansion
of necessary transmission lines,"' and places limits on FERC's
authority."' Making small changes to the Act, such as adding
stricter limits on FERC's siting authority and incentivizing the
creation of compacts that bring interstate perspective to the siting
process, would remedy concerns of both critics and supporters of
the Piedmont case. Adoption of any one of the congressional plans
above would unnecessarily throw out much of the work that the
Department of Energy and FERC have done in creating the
National Corridors under the Energy Policy Act. The following
changes to the existing structure will be adequate to fix the current
system.
1. FERC Should Develop Capacity Plans Within the National
Corridors
FERC should help States within National Corridors develop
Capacity Plans that will map out the expansion of electricity
transmission capacity within the Corridor. FERC would serve as
the national perspective that is needed to remedy regional
congestion problems,"' while allowing States to maintain their
authority to site lines. This planning process should include
existing regional planning entities, utilities, state utility agencies,
and other stakeholders in hopes of achieving broad participation
and consensus on a common plan to ease congestion.
This level of coordination on the issue of renewable energy is
not unprecedented among States; it was done by many of the States
in the Corridor when they adopted their Renewable Portfolio
Standards (RPS). 2" Seven of the eight States within the Corridor
116 16 U.S.C. § 824p(a)(1).
17 Id. § 824p(b)(1)(C).
118 See generally id. § 824p(a)-{b) (laying out a number of conditions that
must be met in order for FERC to exercise its authority to site new transmission
lines).
"9 See supra Part III.A.
120 A Renewable Portfolio Standard is "a state policy that requires electricity
providers to obtain a minimum percentage of their power from renewable
energy resources by a certain date." U.S. Department of Energy, Information
Resources, http://apps l.eere.energy.gov/states/maps/renewableportfoliostates.
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and the District of Columbia have RPS that allow for utilities to
meet their renewable energy requirements with energy produced in
another state located in the PJM region, 2 ' or brought into the PJM
region from States outside the region.'22 The use of similar
language by the states within the region when they authorized the
cfm (last visited on Sept. 21, 2009) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
Law & Technology).
121 See generally PJM-Who We Are, http://www.pjm.com/about-pjm/who-
we-are.aspx (last visited on Sept. 25, 2009) ("PJM Interconnection is a regional
transmission organization (RTO) that coordinates the movement of wholesale
electricity in all or parts of Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland,
Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee,
Virginia, West Virginia and the District of Columbia.") (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
122 See 26 Del. C. § 352(6) (2009) ("'Eligible energy resources' include ...
energy sources located within or imported into the PJM region."); MD. PUB.
UTIL. Cos. CODE ANN. § 7-701(i) (2009) ("'Renewable energy credit' . . .
means a credit ... that is located ... in the PJM region or in a state that is
adjacent to the PJM region; or outside the area described in item (1) of this part
but in a control area that is adjacent to the PJM region, if the electricity is
delivered into the PJM region."); 73 P.S. § 1648.4 (2009) ("For purposes of
compliance with this act, alternative energy sources located in the PJM
Interconnection, L.L.C. regional transmission organization (PJM) or its
successor service territory shall be eligible to fulfill compliance obligations of
all Pennsylvania electric distribution companies and electric generation
suppliers."); N.J.A.C. § 14:8-2.7(b) (2009) ("To qualify as class I or class II
renewable energy for the purposes of this subchapter, energy shall be generated
within or delivered into the PJM region . .. ."); 2004 N.Y. PUC LEXIS 529, 95
("[F]or energy generated outside of New York State to be eligible under the
New York RPS program, it must be delivered into the New York Control
Area."); ORC Ann. 4928.64(B)(3) (2009) ("At least one-half of the renewable
energy resources implemented by the utility or company shall be met through
facilities located in this state; the remainder shall be met with resources that can
be shown to be deliverable into this state."); D.C. CODE § 34-1431(10) (2009)
("'Renewable energy credit' ... means a credit ... [from a] renewable source
that is located: In the PJM Interconnection region or in a state that is adjacent to
the PJM Interconnection region; or ... is adjacent to the PJM Interconnection
region, if the electricity is delivered into the PJM Interconnection region.");
H.B. 103, W.V. 2009, 1st Spec. Sess., (W.V. 2009) (enacted June 2, 2009) ("An
electric utility shall be awarded . .. credits . .. from a renewable energy resource
facility located within the geographical boundaries of this state or located
outside of the geographical boundaries of this state but within the service
territory of a regional transmission organization.").
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use of renewable energy from other states indicates a clear
understanding by the corridor states that meeting their renewable
energy needs will require regional cooperation.
Interstate compacts could serve as good examples of a vehicle
that would coordinate regional planning and cooperation for the
siting of interstate transmission lines.123 Compacts have served as
a useful tool for the management of natural resources since the
creation of our nation 24 and have been the preferred method of the
U.S. Supreme Court when states have had disagreements over
water rights.125
Compacts bring state participants, and in some cases federal
authorities, together to accomplish any number of regional and
interstate priorities.126  Examples of existing compact
responsibilities include: studying issues that affect multiple
States, 2 7 ensuring access for "mental health services ... regardless
of . . . state residency," 28 and determining the allocation of water
within a particular lake basin.129  Creating strong interstate
compacts could provide an effective vehicle for the development
of Capacity Plans.
123 See CAROLINE N. BROUN ET AL., THE EVOLVING USE AND THE CHANGING
ROLE OF INTERSTATE COMPACTS A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 3 (2006)
("[C]ompacts are singularly important because through a compact, the states can
create a state-based solution to regional or national problems and effectively
retain policy control for the future.").
124 Id. at 262 ("[I]nterstate compacts in the natural resource area are as old as
the nation. One of the earliest environmental compacts addressed disputes of
the use and allocation of waters of the Potomac River.").
125 Id. at 264 ("Indeed, the Supreme Court has expressly encouraged states to
resolve water disputes through interstate compacts rather than by equitable
apportionment adjudication.").
126 See id. at 66 (explaining federal participation in interstate compacts).
127 See JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, INTERSTATE COOPERATION COMPACTS AND
ADMINISTRATIVE AGREEMENTS 209 (2002) ("Compacts tend to be very
successful if they establish commissions to conduct studies").
128 BROUN ET AL., supra note 123, at 255.
129 See id. at 278-79 ("In December 2005, the governors of the eight Great
Lake states and the Premiers of Ontario and Quebec signed the ... Great Lakes-
St. Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Water Resources Compact .... [This]
agreement[ ] ban[s] new diversions of water outside the Basin.").
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2. Strengthen the Interstate Compact Provisions of the Energy
Policy Act of 2005
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 provided a potentially powerful
tool for states that wanted to prevent FERC from taking their
authority to site transmission lines. The Act authorized States to
form interstate compacts"' that would create "regional
transmission siting agencies.""' These agencies would be
responsible for conducting the siting of new transmission lines
within the compact states,'32 and FERC would have no authority to
site lines within those states so long as the compact was not in
disagreement over a proposal."' If states within the compact ran
into a disagreement about the siting of a project, FERC would still
be allowed to step in and site the project if approval had been
withheld for more than one year.13
States have increasingly utilized interstate compacts over the
past seventy-five years, and today there are over "200 interstate
compacts on the books."' 35 Compacts are preferred over federal
legislation or regulation in many situations because they have the
ability to facilitate regional cooperation among states while
allowing states to preserve traditionally held powers.'36 Compacts
also force the decision making process to consider state interests
130 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (restricting the use of interstate compacts
unless consent is given by Congress); see generally Felix Frankfurter & James
M. Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution a Study in Interstate
Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685 (1925) (discussing the underutilization of
interstate compacts and their promising potential in the future).
'.' 16 U.S.C. § 824p(i) (2006).
132 Id. at (i)(1)-(2).
' Id. at (i)(4).
134 id.
"3 BROUN ET AL., supra note 123, at 178. Interstate compacts have not
always been a popular tool among states for addressing interstate needs or
problems. "Through roughly the first 140 years of the nation's existence, fewer
than 40 interstate compacts were enacted." Id.
136 Id at 26 ("[C]ompacts provide an effective solution that respects
fundamental principles of federalism, recognizing the supremacy of the federal
government regarding national issues while allowing the states to take
appropriate collective action in addressing supra-state problems.").
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that are typically marginalized at the federal level"' and tend to
provide "a high level of responsiveness to local and state needs.""'
Lastly, compacts are effective at incorporating the federal
government's interests on a particular issue because Congress has
to consent to the compacts formation."'
The Pacific Northwest Electric Power and Conservation
Planning Council ("Council") is an example of a compact that
deals with energy/resource planning issues and could serve as a
model for States within the Corridor. Approved in 1980,140 the
compact is responsible for "facilitating the orderly planning of the
region's power system,"" "assur[ing] the Pacific Northwest of an
adequate, efficient, economical, and reliable power supply,"'42 and
"encourag[ing] ... conservation and efficiency in the use of
electric power, and the development of renewable resources within
the Pacific Northwest."'4 3 The Council was created to handle
interstate issues surrounding the use of electricity and water from
the Columbia River Basin,' and manages interstate concerns
through the development and periodic update of a "regional
13 Id. at 27 ("Because federal government agencies are generally politically
removed from state interests, federal administrators tend not to emphasize
regional concerns, thus portraying some insensitivity toward important state
interests. The interstate compact provides states with the opportunity to offset
this federal insensitivity.").
38 Id. at 27 ("[S]tates in a specific region or involved with a specific issue are
generally more familiar with the circumstances surrounding such problems than
federal officials, who are generally more . . . geographically and politically
removed.").
19 See id. at 28 ("To a large extent the Compact Clause requirement of
congressional consent to those compacts impacting federal interests ensures that
federal concerns are at the forefront of compact design.").
140 See Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act, Pub.
L. No. 96-501, 94 Stat. 2697 (1980) (codified at 16 U.S.C. 839 (2009)) (The
compact is formed by the states of Idaho, Montana, Oregon, and Washington.);
see also Seattle Master Builders Ass'n v. Pac. N.W. Elec. Power &
Conservation Planning Council, 786 F.2d 1359, 1363 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding
the Pacific Northwest Electric Power and Conservation Planning Council was a
compact agency).
141 16 U.S.C. § 839(3)(B) (2006).
142 Id. § 839(2).
143 Id. § 839(1).
'" Id. § 839.
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conservation and electric power plan ("Plan")."' 45 The Plan serves
as the blueprint for the Bonneville Power Administration
("Administration") that is responsible for the operation of the
Federal Columbia River Power System and requires that the
Administration act "consistent with the plan." 46 While the Council
does not have authority to site transmission lines, it does include an
assessment of the need for increased transmission capacity in its
Plan,'47 and in its most recent draft of the proposed new version of
the Plan has called for "regional transmission planning efforts . . .
to bring in new renewable resources."148 This type of compact is
one of many across the country that has been developed to manage
resources and, if given additional authority to site interstate
transmission lines, stands to serve as a model for compacts that
might be created in National Corridors.149
In order to encourage the creation of new interstate compacts
within the corridor, Congress should strengthen the current
incentives for participation within the compact provisions of the
Energy Policy Act of 2005. First, Congress should maintain the
requirement that the compacts create regional transmission siting
145 Id. § 839b(a)(1)(A).
146 Id. § 839b(d)(2).
147 See Pac. N.W. ELEC. POWER AND CONSERVATION PLANNING COUNCIL,
THE FIFTH NORTHWEST ELECTRIC POWER AND CONSERVATION PLAN, 9-1
(2005), http://www.nwcouncil.org/energy/powerplan/5/(09)%2OTransmission
.pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2009) (discussing the transmission needs of the region)
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
148 PAC. N. W. ELEC. POWER AND CONSERVATION PLANNING COUNCIL, DRAFT
SIXTH NORTHWEST ELECTRIC POWER AND CONSERVATION PLAN 6a-10 (2009)
http://www.nwcouncil.org/energy/powerplan/6/Ch6a_090309.pdf (last visited
Oct. 11, 2009) (discussing the need for regional planning in meeting electricity
transmission needs) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology).
149 See BROUN ET AL., supra note 123, at 177 ("[G]rowing concerns in recent
years about the reliability and security of the nation's electric power grid might
best be addressed through interstates administrative compacts of regional or
national scope. Such agreements could facilitate the cooperative siting and
maintenance of transmission lines . . . ."); see generally BROUN ET AL., supra
note 123, at 261-362 (identifying current environmental and natural resource
compacts).
172 [VOL. 11: 145
States and National Energy Policy
agencies."' These agencies should identify current and future
energy needs within the compact and greater geographical region,
as well as develop the capacity plans to meet both. The agency
should also be empowered to site new interstate transmission
projects within states participating in the compact and control
access to those interstate transmission lines. Giving the agency
siting authority for interstate transmission facilities is necessary so
that the siting process is simplified and expedited. Moving the
siting process from a multi-state process that requires each
individual state to approve a transmission project to a centralized
regional process that only requires the agency's approval will
reduce the time and resources needed for approval. It will also
broaden the focus of the approval process from a parochial
intrastate analysis to an interstate analysis that will evaluate
transmission project proposals with the compact's needs in mind
rather than the needs of just a single state."'
Second, Congress should limit FERC's authority to site
interstate transmission facilities within states party to a compact.
FERC should only be allowed to exercise their siting authority
when a regional transmission siting agency denies, or withholds for
more than one year, approval of a permit to construct an interstate
transmission facility linking in renewable energy. Limiting
FERC's ability to site within States party to a compact provides a
strong incentive to create compacts because the siting agency
created by the compact will be able to maintain siting authority for
all projects that do not involve siting transmission facilities linking
in renewable energy and are not approve within a year.
Controlling access to interstate transmission lines is critical to
preventing states from undermining the compact process. If states
are allowed to connect energy production facilities within their
own state to a transmission line approved by the siting agency
without the agencies approval, it might result in the spread of non-
renewable energy as was predicted by petitioners in the Piedmont
"s 16 U.S.C. § 824p(i) (2006) (stating that the agencies would be responsible
for conducting the siting of new transmission lines within the compact States).
' BROUN ET AL., supra note 123, at 28 ("[I]nterstate compacts can broaden
parochial focus by allowing states to act collectively and jointly in addressing
regional and national problems.").
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case. A compact that creates a siting agency and empowers it to
site interstate transmission projects will take away a state's ability
to reject an interstate transmission line proposal. If the compacts
fail to establish a mechanism that would control access to new
interstate transmission lines, it will leave states helpless to stop
other states within the compact from linking in non-renewable
energy.
States would also no longer be able to hold up critical interstate
transmission line projects intended to connect renewable energy
producers because FERC would be able to step in when compacts
and siting agencies cannot reach agreement or deny a project. The
proposed limits on FERC's authority would also prevent non-
renewable energy producers from sidestepping a compact's
authority because FERC's siting authority would not extend to
proposals that connect in non-renewable energy. Lastly, compacts
make it harder for cheap non-renewable energy to flood into
markets unless the siting agency approves the project. This type of
regional approval ensures that projects to link in non-renewable
energy are in the interest of the states participating in the compact.
3. Change FERC's Siting Authority in Response to Piedmont
Congress should narrow FERC's siting authority by only
allowing FERC to site when a state or compact agency denies, or
withholds for more than one year, siting approval for an interstate
transmission facility that would connect renewable energy
producers. As highlighted above, Corridors need additional
capacity in order to accommodate new renewable energy suppliers.
Allowing a state or compact to veto a regional or national plan to
link in renewable energy would severely limit the spread of
renewable energy within the nation and leave the corridors in
effectively the same place that they were prior to Piedmont.
Additionally, expanding FERC's siting authority in these situations
will strengthen investors' willingness to provide capital to
renewable energy start up projects. Up until now aspiring
renewable energy producers have been unable to provide
reasonable assurances to investors that new projects will not be
limited in operation by existing transmission capacity
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restrictions.15 2 The assurance that a new project would be able to
link into the grid and operate at levels sufficient to meet an
investor's required return on investment is critical for attracting
new investment in renewable energy.'
Granting FERC siting authority for transmission projects that
link in renewable energy will instill greater confidence in investors
that proposals to expand transmission capacity for renewable
energy can ultimately be evaluated by the federal government
rather than in a decentralized state-by-state process. FERC's
evaluation of a plan will bring a national perspective to a
proposal's evaluation and ensure that denials at the state level are
in the best interest of national energy policy. While this new
authority may strip states and compact agencies of their right to
site new lines in certain situations, it still allows them to maintain
authority over plans that would not deal with non-renewable
energy and also incentivizes them to work with other states and
compacts on projects to expand the use of renewable energy.
V. CONCLUSION
This Recent Development highlights the areas of true conflict
between supporters and critics of the Piedmont decision and
provides an alternative solution to the problem of expanding
152 As discussed earlier, transmission constraints can be "operational limit[s]
imposed to protect reliability." (quoting U.S. Dep't of Energy, supra note 22, at
vii) These operational limits sometimes take the form of requirements that
utilities shutdown production of electricity so that the grid does not exceed
capacity and break down. During these mandatory shutdowns, energy producers
are not able to sell energy and, accordingly, lose revenues that could have been
paid back to investors. Concerns over return on investment arise and reduce an
investor's willingness to invest when they know that transmission capacity
limitations within a region may cause renewable energy projects to shut down in
order to protect grid integrity. See generally Matthew L. Wald, Wind Energy
Bumps Into Power Grid's Limits, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2008 at Al & Al5,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/27/business/27grid.html,
(describing the challenges to investment in wind farms due to congestion and the
absence of transmission lines that can link regions with large renewable energy
potential with large populations centers) (last visited on Sept. 25, 2009) (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
153 See generally id. (discussing the effects of grid capacity on investment in
renewable energy).
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interstate transmission lines. This solution will still require states
and interest groups to make substantial compromises that may
result in disagreements that will require FERC to intervene. But
the proposal also suggests a course of action that will empower
states and interests groups to make these compromises and be
involved in the process from the beginning. The solution carves
out a middle ground that will expedite the approval process for
transmission line facilities, bring regional and national priorities
into the evaluation of transmission proposals, maintain limited
state authority to choose how facilities will be sited, and protect
community interests by limiting the access of non-renewable
energy to new interstate transmission lines.
